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CASE NOTES

take from or enlarge the meaning of a statute by reading into it language
which will, in the opinion of either, correct any supposed omission or
defect,18 and since the legislature in its new enactment departed substantially from the expression of policy as stated in the Descent Act 19 without
any indication that this departure was unintentional, the court seems justified in assuming that the departure was intentional.
Thus it can be seen that Illinois has progressed from the strict rule of
the common law which denied inheritance entirely, into a very liberal
policy, and then seemingly, has dropped back one notch in the cycle. It
will now be up to the legislature in the next session to determine whether
or not Illinois will follow the law as interpreted by the Supreme Court or
will follow the trend toward liberalization of the rules regarding illegitimates, by revising the Probate Act.
PUBLIC LAW-EFFECT OF ZONING ORDINANCE
AMENDMENTS ON BUILDING PERMITS
The plaintiffs sought judicial declaration that the defendant company
had no vested right by virtue of its building permit to construct a manufacturing building in an area zoned for family dwellings. The plaintiffs
contended that the building permit had been subsequently revoked by an
ordinance amendment. However, prior to the effective date of the
amendatory ordinance, the defendant, relying upon a building permit
issued in accordance with the zoning regulations then in force, had
caused substantial work to be done on the premises. The Appellate Court
of Illinois held that the defendant had acquired a vested right under the
permit. The subsequent amendment could not effectively revoke the
building permit. Deer Park Civic Assoc. v. City of Chicago, 347 Ill. App.
346, 106 N.E. 2d 823 (1952).
The problem here presented is a controversial one, and the courts are
not in complete agreement as to how it should be resolved.' Although
they agree that a person should be protected against an amendatory
ordinance revoking his building permit where he, in reliance upon such
permit, has caused substantial work to be done on his premises, there is a
1s American Steel Foundries v. Gordon, 404 III. 174, 88 N.E. 2d 465 (1949).
19 111. Rev. Star. (1939) c. 39, S 2.
1 Brett v. Building Commissioner of Brookline, 250 Mass. 73, 145 N.E. 269 (1924);
Fitzgerald v. Merard Holding Co., 110 Conn. 130, 147 Atl. 513 (1929); Crow v.
Board of Adjustment of Iowa City, 227 Iowa 324, 288 N.W. 145 (1939); City of
Omaha v. Glissaninn, 151 Neb. 895, 39 N.W. 2d 828 (1949); Howe Realty Co. v.
Nashville, 176 Tenn. 405, 141 S.W. 2d 904 (1940); Fairchild Sons v. Rogers, 246
App. Div. 555, 282 N.Y. Supp. 916 (S. Ct., 1935); Southern Leasing Co. v. Ludwig,
168 App. Div. 233, 153 N.Y. Supp. 545 (S. Ct., 1915); Rice v. Van Vranken, 132
Misc. 82, 229 N.Y. Supp. 32 (S. Ct., 1928).
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wide range of disagreement as to what amount of work constitutes sub2
stantial work done.
In a New York decision it was stated that:
Where a permit to build a building has been acted upon, and where the
owner has proceeded to incur obligations and in good faith to proceed to erect
the building, such rights are then vested property rights protected by the federal and state constitutions.a
This same case held that while it was unfortunate for the residential
owners in the immediate sector of the apartment building being built,
since a building permit had been issued for the construction of the
apartment building, and the innocent purchaser of the real estate had
acted in good faith upon the permit to his detriment by surveying the
land and having the excavation work done, the purchaser of the property
acquired vested rights under his permit to complete the apartment building, and the zoning law could not be subsequently amended so that the
building permit would be thereby cancelled.
Another New York decision held that an amendatory zoning ordinance
which prohibited the erection of a gasoline filling station in a certain
region did not preclude the owner or lessee of such premises from proceeding under a permit issued prior to the amendment, since great hardship would have been imposed had the building permit been revoked after
4
the permittee had spent so much money in reliance thereof.
5
In Crow v. Board of Adjustment a veterinarian wished to build an
animal hospital in a certain neighborhood. Relying upon the advice of
the building inspector and upon a building permit, the veterinarian purchased a lot, cleared it, and otherwise relied upon the permit to his detriment. Later the adjoining land owners brought action to have the permit
cancelled. The permit was cancelled; however, on appeal the decision of
the board was reversed and the permit sustained. The court held that the
permit had a valid inception, and since construction work was begun, the
resulting change in status gave the permittee a vested right to continue under the permit as issued, and because of this, the permit was
irrevocable.
In the case of City of Omaha v. GlissmannO the court went even further
in presenting the more equitable rule. The court stated:
2A uthorities cited note 1 supra.
3Pelham View Apartments v. Switzer, 130 Misc. 545, 546, 224 N.Y. Supp. 56, 58,
(S. Ct., 1927); To the same effect: Sandenburgh v. Michigamme Oil Co., 249 Mich.
372, 228 N.W. 707 (1930).
4 New York Investing Co. v. Brady, 214 App. Div. 592, 212 N.Y. Supp. 605 (S.
Ct., 1925).
5227 Iowa 324, 288 N.W. 145 (1939).
6 151 Neb. 895, 39 N.W. 2d 828 (1949).
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If after a purchase or leasing thereof, a permit is obtained to use lands for
a use then permissible under the zoning ordinances and either substantial construction is made thereon or substantial liabilities are incurred relating directh
thereto, or both, before the permit is cancelled or revoked then the right to
such use has become established and vests as a permissive nonconforming usc
which cannot be affected by a subsequent change.7
However, the court held that since the only work done was some grading, and digging, no vested right existed in the permittee and his permit
could be revoked.
The element of hardship is an important factor in these cases and, in
the absence of such a showing, the courts will generally enforce the
amendment and cancel the pre-existing permit.8 Such a result occured in
the case of Fitzgerald v. Merard Holding Co.9 The court in that case
held that the possession of a permit to build, couimencement of construction, or the fact that contracts entered into with third parties might be
affected, did not constitute a vested right, the invasion or deprivation of
which by amendatory ordinance would invalidate the amendment on
constitutional grounds. The court implied that had the building been
substantially in the course of construction, the building permit might
have been sustained.
In the leading case of Brett v. Building Commissioner'o the court held
that persons to whom permits for the construction of two-family dwellings had been issued would not be protected and would be affected by
subsequent amendments prohibiting such structures to be built, although
they had started work pursuant to their permits. The court held that the
excavation, engineering work, and forms constructed did not constitute
work done, i.e., existing structures within the meaning of those words in
the statute." Although the decision of this case was proper under the
peculiar statute of Massachusetts, the result seems most unjust and inequitable. Certainly excavation, engineering work, and forms set up for
pouring foundations are an integral part of the construction of buildings.
The costs incurred should be and are considered costs in building construction. Where such work is done on large buildings, it will entail
tremendous costs, much more than the total construction costs of smaller
buildings. A person incurring such costs in good faith should be protected. The cost of pouring the concrete foundation should hardly be
considered work done any more than excavation or form setting for the
foundation. It is general knowledge in the construction field that very
7 Supra, at pp. 899, 834.
8 City of Omaha v. Glissmann, 151 Neb. 895, 39 N.XV. 2d 828 (1949); Brett v.
Building Commissioner of Brookline, 250 Mass. 73, 145 N.E. 269 (1924).
, 110 Conn. 130, 147 Atl. 513 (1929).
1°250 Mass. 73, 145 N.E. 269 (1924).
"Mass G.L. (1932) c. 40, § 29.
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often it costs more money to excavate the land and set up the forms for
the foundation than to pour it.
In Illinois the precise issue raised by the present case had not previously
been before the courts. However, in earlier cases the courts had applied
equitable estoppel where an owner, in reliance upon affirmative acts of
the city, had made expensive improvements or had otherwise relied upon
such acts to his detriment."-' In the present case, the defendant had relied
upon his building permit and caused the building site to be rough graded,
excavations for foundations and footings dug and pumped dry, underground sewer, drainage, water, and gas lines installed, and form work
for column and line wall footings and foundations installed. The defendant had incurred liabilities upon the construction contracts amounting to
approximately $600,000.00. Most of the work had been done upon contracts entered into before the permit was even issued. However, the court
made no distinction between the work done upon contracts entered into
before and upon those entered into after the permit was issued. The Illinois Court followed the more equitable rule of the Glissmann and Crow
cases.
The result obtained in the present case would seem to be the more reasonable and equitable one in a society where zoning regulations are so
important. It protects a person when he should be protected, namely,
where he has relied upon existent zoning ordinances in undertaking construction contracts and work upon his premises. In states strictly following the rule of the Brett case that zoning laws are not contracts by the
government and may be amended unless a great deal of work has been
done, the property owner will be forever waiting for subsequent amendments before undertaking construction. Even after all the wasteful waiting, an amendment may still be passed affecting the property before
construction is "far enough along" so as to give the owner a vested right.
This will result in much unfairness and the purposes of the zoning ordinances will be defeated because people will be less inclined to rely upon
them in fear of subsequent amendments.
PROPERTY-PUBLIC POLICY AND ITS EFFECT ON THE
PROOF OF PAROL GIFTS CAUSA MORTIS
Plaintiff was a nurse who, in the course of her employment, frequently
visited Emily Collinson, aged sixty-nine and in ill health. When Emily
Collinson's health took a turn for the worse, the plaintiff arranged to admit her to a hospital. During the ride to the hospital, Emily Collinson
said to the alleged donee, "Here is a box, I am giving it to you, and if I
die, it is yours. I don't want anyone else to have it." Emily Collinson died
12 Hurt v. Hejhal, 259 IlL. App. 221 (1930); The People v. Thompson, 209 Il.
App. 570 (1918).

